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none of the above propositions is a sound basis for the rule, Rodgers v.
Meranda concluded that the preference of the individual creditors in the
separate estate resulted "as a necessary correlative" from the preference
given the firm creditors in the firm assets. As pointed out in Robinson
v. Security Co., 87 Conn. 268 (1913), this reason is scarcely better
than the ones discussed and rejected by the Ohio court. It may often
happen that the individual estates will pay out a large percentage to the
individual creditors and the firm assets will pay out a very small per-
centage to the firm creditors. This Connecticut case adopted the rule of
the Ohio statute that firm creditors to the extent that their claims are
unsatisfied by firm assets share in the separate estates of the partners
par passu with the individual creditors. A few other jurisdictions have
adopted the same rule. Barton National Bank v. Atkis, 72 Vt. 33
(1899), Freeport Stone Co. v. Carey's./dm'r, 42 W. Va. 276 (1896),
Pettyjohn v. Voodruff, 86 Va. 478 (189o). Still a different rule was
adopted by decision in Kentucky, Northern Bank v. Keizer, 63 Ky. 169
(x865), and by statute in Georgia, Johnson v. Gordon, 102 Ga. 350,
30 S.E. 507 (1897).
It is apparent that in the absence of the statute the non-depositor
creditors would have shared equally with the depositors in the partner-
ship assets, and that neither of them could have shared in the separate
estates of the partners until all individual creditors had been satisfied.
By the statute, however, the depositors were preferred above the
general creditors of the firm in the firm assets and were given an addi-
tional right to compete with the individual creditors of the partners in
the separate estates. In the light of the history of the opposing rules it
would seem that no other interpretation of the Ohio statute was possible.
D. M. POSTLEWAITE
WILLS
PUBLICATION AND REPUBLICATION IN OHIO - PROBABLE
EFFECT OF SECTION 10504-3, GENERAL CODE, ON THIS
PROBLEM
Ever since the decision of Collins v. Collins, I 1o Ohio St. 105,
143 N.E. 561, 38 A.L.R. 230 (1924) the Ohio view as to the requi-
sites for revival of a revoked will has been in doubt. In that case the
testator destroyed a codicil to his will by tearing it up with the intention
of restoring the will to its original condition. On the question as to
whether there had been a sufficient revival of the original will the court,
interpreting section 10562 (now 10504-54) General Code, held that
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to constitute a valid revivor of the revoked will, the testator must ac-
knowledge the instrument to be his last will before the witnesses who
had already signed his will, or if before other witnesses, then those
witnesses must sign the will at the request of the testator, or the testator
and two witnesses must sign some other instrument showing such intent;
or such testator must republish his will with the same formalities as
attended its original execution and publication.
Is it necessary to publish a will in Ohio in order to make its original
execution valid? Is it necessary to republish the same, using the term
"republish" in the sense "to publish again," in order to revive a will
once revoked? In view of the use by the court of the terms "republica-
tion" and "acknowledgment," the previous Ohio cases as to the necessity
of publication in this state, and the wording of sections 10505 (now
105o4-3) and 10562 (now 10504-54) General Code, these questions
arise.
As used in the field of wills, "publication" is the act of making it
known to the witnesses that the instrument is intended to be the last
will and testament of the testator. Page, Wills (2nd. ed.) Sec. 353-
"Republication" is defined by the same authority as "any act which gives
new validity, as of the date of publication, to a will which was executed
at some time theretofore." Page, Wills (2nd. ed) Sec. 505. The term
"acknowledge" is used to convey the meaning to admit as one's own,
and is usually used in connection with the signature to a will. Unfortu-
nately, however, the courts have carelessly used these terms and all the
Ohio cases must be construed with this fact in mind.
On the question of publication as a requisite to the proper execution
of a will at the time of the Collins case, supra, the most nearly applicable
Ohio Code provision then read in part as follows: "Such will shall - *
be attested and subscribed in the presence of such party, by two or more
competent witnesses, who saw the testator subscribe or heard him ac-
knowledge it." (The words of this statute were the same as those
formerly set out in Section 5916 of the Revised Statutes, except that the
'last words in the latter were "the same" instead of the present "it.")
The question often arose under these two earlier statutes as to the
proper antecedent of the words "the same" and "it." Was it "such
will" or was it the testator's act of subscribing? It could not be expected
that the lower courts of Ohio, with this ambiguous wording of the stat-
ute, would arrive at a unanimity of decision. In In re Wilamson's Willm,
6 Ohio N.P. 8I, 8 Ohio Dec. 47 (1898), it was held that where the
witnesses to a will saw the testator subscribe, it was not necessary that he
acknowledge the instrument. (Note that here "acknowledge" is used to
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mean "publish"). But in Tims v. Tims, i4 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 273
(1911 ), where the testator signed in the presence of both witnesses,
who then subscribed, the will was held invalid because the testator did
not make known to one of the witnesses that the instrument was a will.
In In re Reckard's T'Vill, 15 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 465 (1914), the court
held that where both witnesses saw the testator sign, it was unnecessary
that the witnesses be informed in any manner as to the nature of the
instrument. But in In the Estate of Nicholson, 20 Ohio N.P. (N.S.)
189 (904), it was said that "what our statute prescribes is the Publi-
cation of the will in the presence of the attesting witnesses." In this
case the will was signed in the absence of the subscribing witnesses and
the court construed "the same" in the statute to mean the will and not
merely the signature. Haynes v. Haynes, 33 Ohio St. 598 (878), at
page 614 states: "In the absence of the attesting witnesses, the will and
signature to the same, must be acknowledged by the testator to the attest-
ing witnesses." The syllabus in Keyl v. Feuchter, 56 Ohio St. 524, 47
N.E. 140 (1897), where the testator signed out of the presence of the
attesting witnesses, reads as follows: "One essential to the admission of a
paper writing purporting to be a will to probate is that it shall have been
acknowledged in the presence of two subscribing witnesses."
The case of Underwood v. Rutan, x Ohio St. 306, 128 N.E. 78
(i92o), seemed to settle one point at least; that where the witnesses
see the testator sign, there need be no publication that the instrument
is his will. The syllabus of the case states: "When two subscribing
witnesses have seen a testatrix subscribe her name to a will * * * and the
signature so made is then attested and subscribed by said witnesses in the
testatrix's presence, the will is properly executed. In such case it is not
necessary that the testatrix declare that the instrument is her will or that
she has signed it."
In speaking of Keyl v. Feuchter, supra, the court said that, "the
quoted syllabus undoubtedly has gone beyond the scope which the facts
in the case and the per curiam warrant. While the language of the
syllabus states that one essential to the admission of a will is that it
should be acknowledged by the maker as his will," (i.e., "published"),
"an examination of the case discloses that the real issue involved was
whether the signature of the testator, made in the absence of a subscrib-
ing witness, was acknowledged in the presence of the latter."
This seemed to settle the problem under the former statute by set-
ting up the following requirements: (i) That where the testator signed
in the presence of the witnesses, it was unnecessary that he make known
that the instrument was his will, but (by way of dictum) that (2)
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where the testator did not sign in the presence of such attesting witnesses,
it was necessary that he make known, i.e., "publish," the instrument
as his will as well as to acknowledge his signature.
Under the language used in the statute, it could be reasonably im-
plied that publication was not required in any case. This is the view
taken by John S. Bachman, "Wills - Execution - Acknowledgment
Publication- General Code, Section 10505," 3 University of Cin-
cinnati Law Review, page 191 (1929). He states at page 195: "Since
where the witnesses see the testator subscribe it is unnecessary that they
be informed that the instrument is a will, it would seem to follow neces-
sarily that the essential fact to which the witnesses attest is that the sig
nature is that of the testator, and that if the will is signed in the absence
of the witnesses, the testator must acknowledge only the signature as
his own.
On the hypothesis that publication was required in Ohio only in the
instance stated above at the time of the decision of the CollMns case, we
turn to an examination of the rule laid down therein requiring, in order
to revive and validate a revoked will, that it must be "republished."
The section of the General Code immediately pertinent to that problem
was section 10562 (now 10504-54), which read in part as follows:
"After making a will, if the testator duly makes and executes a second
will, the destruction, cancellation, or revocation of the second will, shall
not revive the first will unleis the terms of such revocation show that
it was his intention to revive and give effect to his first will; or, after
such destruction, cancellation, or revocation, he duly republishes his
first will."
In construing this section the court quoted with approval from In
the Matter of Stickney, 161 N. Y. 42, 55 N.E. 396, 76 Am. St. Rep.
246 (1899), where the court interpreting a similar statute stated: "To
render the execution of a will effectual, the testator must declare the
instrument to be his last will and testament in the presence of at least
two subscribing witnesses, * * *. With a dear understanding of the
requirements necessary to the proper publication of a will, we are to
interpret the provisions of the statute relating to the republication of such
an instrument. * * * It was the intent * * * by this statute to require
the same formalities * * * to establish a republication of a will as are
plainly required to establish its original publication."
In New York Decedent's Estate Laws, 19o9, chapter i8, para-
graph 21, publication is expressly required to execute a valid will. The
court, in the Collins case, followed the rule in In the Matter of Stickney,
supra, without considering those instances where no publication is re-
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quired in Ohio. However, it approved the New York court's statement
that the sections referring to execution and revival are in pari maeria
and must be construed together. We immediately ask: Does the Court
mean to hold that republication in its etymological sense, i.e., "to pub-
lish again" is to be required? Or is it using the term in the sense of
"re-execution"? If it is the former, then by implication the court is
assuming that the will must be made known as one's own, for there
could not be a republication without a publication in the first instance.
The term "republication" is an unfortunate one and its use should
be fully and explicitly explained. If the court meant to use the term
in its etymological sense it should have distinguished those situations
where no publication is required in the first instance and those where
it is not so required. That the court did so mean to use the term is
shown by its statements in the principal case that "to constitute a valid
revivor of the revoked will, the testator must acknowledge the instru-
ment to be his last will before the witnesses who had already signed his
will, or such testator must republish his will with the same formalities
as attended its original execution and publication." (writer's italics)
Thus it distinguishes between execution and publication. It would seem
that the statements of the court are too broad.
In 1930 the Special Committee on Revision of the Ohio Probate
Laws of the Ohio State Bar Association recommended that Sec. 10505
of the Geineral Code be amended to "require that testator declare in-
strument as a will, whether witnesses see him sign or hear him acknowl-
edge his signature" (Recom. 97, P. 54 of Second Report, Jan. 1930).
This recommendation did not, however, find expression in the new
Probate Code of 1932. On the contrary, all ambiguity as to require-
ment of publication was resolved contrary to the Committee's sugges-
tion, for the present section (0504-3) now reads: "Who saw the
testator subscribe or heard him acknowledge his signature" (writer's
italics). This change in the statute would seem to indicate a legislative
intention that no publication is to be required in the original execution
of a will in any case. If this is true, then no matter how the term
"republication" has been used heretofore, it should now be interpreted
to mean "re-execution" rather than "publication again."
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